Subject: RISKS DIGEST 14.19 REPLY-TO: risks@csl.sri.com RISKS-LIST: RISKS-FORUM Digest Tuesday 22 December 1992 Volume 14 : Issue 19 FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND RELATED SYSTEMS ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy, Peter G. Neumann, moderator Contents: Computer error leaves Bundestag speechless (Debora Weber-Wulff) Doctor service phone logs skewed (Steen Hansen) Statistical biasing (Clay Jackson) Solution found to risks of computers in elections! (Jan I. Wolitzky) Overheard by Don Knuth on recent trip (Phyllis Winkler via Les Earnest) Flying Books Threaten Computer Inventory (Bill McGeehan) Navy Cancels Jammer System (PGN) Public information (Phil Agre) Call for Comments on Computing and the Clinton Administration (Gary Chapman) The RISKS Forum is moderated. Contributions should be relevant, sound, in good taste, objective, coherent, concise, and nonrepetitious. Diversity is welcome. 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Relevant contributions may appear in the RISKS section of regular issues of ACM SIGSOFT's SOFTWARE ENGINEERING NOTES, unless you state otherwise. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Fri, 11 Dec 1992 09:02:51 GMT From: weberwu@inf.fu-berlin.de (Debora Weber-Wulff) Subject: Computer error leaves Bundestag speechless The German Bundestag, which had just moved into its brand-new, expensive quarters in Bonn (they'll be moving to Berlin someday, but this building was started when the Wall was still up), has been forced to move back into its old plenary building because of computer errors. The new building was installed with a special sound control system that was specifically designed to eliminate all the problems with feedback, screeching, volume adjustments and such that had plagued the old system. During the big budget debate (where the cost overruns in the new building were to be discussed as well :-) the sound system turned itself down to a whisper - no one could follow the speeches. After a 5 hour pause while technicians searched for the cause, the Bundestag moved back into the old building to resume the debates. The cause: The architects had worked out an extremely symbolic form and used symbolic materials to create the building. The plenary chamber is round and completely enclosed in (bullet-proof) glass, to underline the transparancy of the parliamentary process. This glass, however, does not absorb the sound, but rather it bounces it back. The computers, detecting feedback, turn down the volume to avoid this problem. A steady state is only achieved when the microphones are turned off. It will take until March to either replace the computerized system or put carpeting over the glass walls. Debora Weber-Wulff dww@inf.fu-berlin.de Institut fuer Informatik +49 30 89691 124 Nestorstr. 8-9 (INCLUDE "standard.disclaimer") D-W-1000 Berlin 31 (PRINTN (WITTY-MESSAGE TODAY)) ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 11 Dec 92 13:13:26 EST From: steen@kiwi.swhs.ohio-state.edu Subject: Doctor service phone logs skewed A new central system is being tested in Denmark for people to call a doctor service at off hours, and possibly get a housecall (this is for non-emergency cases, i.e., not the equivalent of 911). The patients in the Danish city of Odense complained loudly that the waiting for a phone call to be answered was too long, while the provider said their computerized logs showed no caller had to wait more than 10 minutes. After many complaints they tested the equipment, which showed it was not able to register waits longer than 10 minutes! Steen Hansen If you are interested in further details, please e-mail lea@dde.dk (Leif Erik Andersen), who quotes the danish radio news on Dec 9, 1992. Den nye laegevagt paa Fyn har maattet erkende, at systemet ikke var saa velfungerende som laegerne haevdede. Paa trods af gentagne klager fra patienter over lange ventetider paa telefonen, haevdede laegevagtens ansatte at ingen havde ventet i mere en ti minutter. I gaar kom det saa frem, at edb-registreringen ikke kunne registrere ventetider laenger end de ti minutter! Laegerne stolede blindt paa udstyr, som slet ikke var beregnet til at registrere ventetid, ifoelge Fyns Telefon. Laegevagtens leder, Per Holm Pedersen, har givet fynboerne en 'uforbeholden undskyldning'. [DR, onsdag] ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 11 Dec 92 17:39:28 GMT From: uswnvg!cjackso@uunet.UU.NET (Clay Jackson) Subject: Statistical biasing (Re: Moore, RISKS 14.18) |A couple of items in RISKS touched upon computer systems and technology |affecting people's behaviour and causing changes in our society. There is |a risk that some changes may be undesirable and unintended. When I was a supervisor in a large phone-in technical support operation (a few years back now), we introduced a metrics program that recorded a number of statistics about the calls the techicians were processing. Two of those statistics were "Available Time" (time spent being available to take calls, even if there were no calls coming to your phone) and time per call. One of the other managers decided to set minimum standards for all of the metrics. So, an enterprising tech wrote a program on a PC to dial home (where no one was there to answer the phone), wait some random time and then hang up and dial again. Until we caught on, that person's statistics were the best in the group; and the others in the group (who knew what was going on) were grumbling. Fortunately, we caught it before permanent damage (i.e., a changed performance rating or some sort of salary adjustment) was done. Clay Jackson - N7QNM, US WEST NewVector Group Inc, Bellevue, WA ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 18 Dec 92 16:43 EST From: wolit@mhuxd.att.com Subject: Solution found to risks of computers in elections! According to the Associated Press today, officials in South Korea decided to use the abacus to tabulate 24 million votes in Friday's presidential elections. The abacus was used to avoid a recurrence of charges in the 1987 presidential race that the computer count was electronically manipulated. The Central Election Management Committee employed about 300 abacus experts to oversee the counting. It's curious that these people find manual manipuation -- an unnecessary backformation, since manipulation MEANS movement by hand -- of an election to be preferable to electronic manipulation. wolit@mhuxd.att.com Jan I. Wolitzky, AT&T Bell Laboratories, 600 Mountain Avenue, Room 3D-590, Murray Hill, NJ 07974-2070 1-908-582-2998 Fax: 1-908-582-5417 [A Deutsche Press-Agentur news item quoted a Committee official who said, "We are sorry we can't use the fast and economical way of tallying with computers but we like to be fair and accurate above all." PGN] ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 15 Dec 92 14:48:18 -0800 From: Les Earnest Subject: Overheard by Don Knuth on recent trip From: Phyllis Winkler Subject: Overheard by Don Knuth on recent trip Q. What kind of computer music will President Clinton play on his saxophone? A. Al Gore rhythms. --- Cornell U Linguistics Department ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 14 Dec 92 10:51:19 EST From: Bill McGeehan Subject: Flying Books Threaten Computer Inventory A story in the Washington Post on 7 Dec 92 entitled "Va. Book Vendor Rescued from a Storied Ending" ended with lessons in both safety in the library and computer security. The following is a summary of that article: Mike Keck was nearly buried alive in his Alexandria Virginia bookstore, From Out of the Past. Mike was working in the "aviation" section when a metal shelf attached to a wall came "flying" loose, tipped over and started a domino effect that quickly toppled almost one million magazines. "As I fell, I twisted to protect myself; the twisting broke the socket of my hip." His wife, Barbara said, "Once it started, there was no stopping it. All the racks gave way". The rescue squad had to use a torch to cut away the twisted metal that was trapping Mike. Barbara also said "I videotaped it ... for insurance purposes. Right now the computer doesn't look like it was damaged. ALL MY INVENTORY IS IN IT, AND I HOPE IT WILL BE OK." I was struck by this thought: would that be a MILLION records? Wouldn't some offsite backup be appropriate? Bill McGeehan, Smithsonian Institution, OIRM Computer Security Manager IRMTAQA2@SIVM.SI.EDU IRMTAQA2@SIVM.BITNET Voice: (202) 633-9035 ------------------------------ Date: Sat, 19 Dec 92 14:52:17 PST From: "Peter G. Neumann" Subject: Navy Cancels Jammer System WASHINGTON (AP, 15 Dec 92) The Navy on Tuesday canceled $835 million worth of contracts for an electronic radar-jamming system criticized for years inside the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill. The Airborne Self-Protection Jammer was being developed by the Navy for a variety of carrier-based warplanes, such as the F-14, F/A-18 and the E/A-6. The Pentagon had spent more than 15 years and $1.5 billion to develop the system. It had ordered 136 of the devices, which were supposed to confuse enemy surface-to-air missile radars. But the system, which was being developed by a number of firms, never passed its flight tests. At one point, the Navy acknowledged that testing standards on the system had been relaxed, but the system was unable to meet even the lowered standards. Over the years, the jammer became a symbol of weapons kept in development before the bugs were ironed out. In its statement, the Navy said, "The decision to terminate ... was made because it was determined in operational testing that the system was not operationally effective and not operationally suitable." The Navy said it was canceling nine production contracts with: Consolidated Electronic Countermeasures, which is composed of I.T.T. of Nutley N.J., and Westinghouse of Baltimore., Md.; I.T.T. and Westinghouse, operating separately; Westinghouse Electronic Systems Co., (Welsco) of Baltimore, Md., and Smith Industries of Florham Park, N.J. ... Earlier this year, Sens. David Pryor, D.-Ark., and William V. Roth Jr., R-Del., charged that the Pentagon had manipulated its testing data to minimize the system's problems, but the Navy promised it would apply toughened standards. ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 17 Dec 92 17:17:47 -0800 From: pagre@weber.ucsd.edu (Phil Agre) Subject: public information A number of advocacy groups have recently been involved in efforts to make public information, for example from the Congress, available electronically. One of the reasons frequently cited for such efforts is the desire for open government. This notion of open government is normally opposed to a set of images of behind-closed-doors government in which politicians cut deals with cigar-smoking lobbyists. Although open government is a good thing in the abstract, I wonder if many of the motivations for it are misplaced, leading to false solutions to deeper problems. As evidence for this possibility, I would cite the following article: Robert L. Heath, Working through trade associations and public information organizations, in Robert L. Heath, ed, Strategic Issues Management: How Organizations Influence and Respond to Public Interests and Policies, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1988. This is a brief description of NAMNET, a computer network that has been operated by the National Association of Manufacturers since 1987. NAM, of course, has long been famous for its aggressive and well-funded lobbying on issues such as labor organizing and workplace health and safety regulations. (It opposes these things.) Among the many features of NAMNET is software support for what has become known in business as "grassroots lobbying", in which a special interest with substantial infrastructure (whether in-house or contracted from commercial firms) mobilizes its allies in a highly selective and focused way on very short notice to influence the proceedings of, for example, a legislature. Now, some people argue that electronic open government will level the playing field by giving The People access to the same information as special interests. But maybe it doesn't work that way. Techniques like NAM's (and others, such as direct mail techniques based on the application of massive computing power to databases of personal information) have brought a quiet revolution to the day-to-day conduct of politics. Far from being run behind closed doors, information technology now allows politics to be conducted through the rapid, top-down, real-time mobilization of massive "constituencies". And these methods quickly come down to money: it is now entirely feasible to purchase a precise, measurable amount of pressure on any given issue on any Senator of your choice. The more money you have, the more pressure you can buy. (For more of this, see Wm. Greider's book "Who Will Tell the People?") So how about it? If we wish to strengthen democracy, should we welcome electronic "open government" or oppose it? What alternative models of information technology's relationship to government would be less amenable to high-powered manipulation and more amenable to the electronic cultures within which we might reinvent democracy? Phil Agre, UCSD ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 16 Dec 92 12:43:20 -0500 From: chapman@silver.lcs.mit.edu (Gary Chapman) Subject: Call for Comments on Computing and the Clinton Administration PLEASE CIRCULATE THIS WHEREVER YOU FEEL IT IS APPROPRIATE BUT ONLY WHERE YOU FEEL IT IS APPROPRIATE AN OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE YOUR SAY ABOUT COMPUTING IN THE FUTURE This is Gary Chapman, director of the Cambridge, Massachusetts, office of Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility. I edit The CPSR Newsletter, a quarterly publication that goes to all CPSR members and about 400 other people, including a lot of policymakers, members of Congress, administration officials, etc. We're going to try something unusual for the next CPSR Newsletter, and I'm putting out a call for help. We're going to publish a special issue on "What the Clinton Administration Can Do For The Computing Profession and the Public." I'm sending out this message to ask people to send me SHORT contributions to this issue, just brief comments about what the new administration can do to help support computing in the United States, or perhaps the world. Here are a few basic guidelines for these submissions: 1. SHORT MEANS SHORT -- In order to publish as many of these as we can, we need to keep each contribution to about 100-150 words, max, one or two paragraphs. In fact, anything longer will probably be eliminated out of fairness to others. 2. YOU MUST IDENTIFY YOURSELF -- Again, briefly, with just your name and one line that says something about you, such as Joe Blow or Sally Smith, Programmer, BillyBob Corporation, or Centerville, Ohio, or something like that, whatever you prefer. 3. ADDRESS ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY -- In order to make these contributions relevant to the Clinton administration, they should concern issues about which government can or should do something, or stop doing, whatever. These include major issues such as privacy, access to information, computer networks like the Internet or NREN, R&D priorities, equitable access to computers, intellectual property, defense policy, risks to the public, etc. We're not really interested in contributions that are self-serving, parochial, excessively arcane or trivial, belligerently and unconstructively critical, and so on. We will favor messages that discuss the intersection of computing and major issues of concern to the public at large. 4. PLEASE INCLUDE A WORKABLE E-MAIL ADDRESS -- In case I have to get back to you about the text. We won't publish e-mail addresses, I promise. 5. GET ALL CONTRIBUTIONS TO ME BY JANUARY 15, 1993. My e-mail address is chapman@silver.lcs.mit.edu. This is not limited to people in the United States, although overseas contributors will have to make a case for what the Clinton administration should do to help international computing -- the focus will be on U.S. government policy. We're going to try and get this issue into the hands of the key players on computing and high tech policy in the new administration. For the most part we already know who those people are, and we're talking to them about the issues that CPSR is working on. This newsletter will give them a good impression, we hope, of the concerns of the computing profession and people who use computer networks. Consider this an opportunity for a kind of "hard copy" town hall. Thanks for your help! Get those messages coming! Gary Chapman, Coordinator The 21st Century Project Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility Cambridge, MA chapman@silver.lcs.mit.edu ------------------------------ End of RISKS-FORUM Digest 14.19 ************************