Subject: RISKS DIGEST 13.33 REPLY-TO: risks@csl.sri.com RISKS-LIST: RISKS-FORUM Digest Thursday 2 April 1992 Volume 13 : Issue 33 FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND RELATED SYSTEMS ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy, Peter G. Neumann, moderator Contents: William Gibson, An (On-Line) Book of the Dead (PGN) NSA and cryptographic software (PGN) US Navy radar jammers pass test despite software errors (Jay Brown) SDI (from Newsweek) (John Sloan) A remarkably stupid design decision (Geoff Kuenning) Risk of "parameter validation" hype (Mark Jackson) Re: FBI v. digital phones (Daniel B. Dobkin) Re: Laws to Ease Wiretapping (A. Padgett Peterson) Re: Aviation Software Certification (Brian Randell) WAR GAMES II (Eric S. Raymond) The RISKS Forum is moderated. Contributions should be relevant, sound, in good taste, objective, coherent, concise, and nonrepetitious. Diversity is welcome. CONTRIBUTIONS to RISKS@CSL.SRI.COM, with relevant, substantive "Subject:" line. Others may be ignored! Contributions will not be ACKed. The load is too great. **PLEASE** INCLUDE YOUR NAME & INTERNET FROM: ADDRESS, especially .UUCP folks. REQUESTS please to RISKS-Request@CSL.SRI.COM. Vol i issue j, type "FTP CRVAX.SRI.COMlogin anonymousAnyNonNullPW CD RISKS:GET RISKS-i.j" (where i=1 to 13, j always TWO digits). Vol i summaries in j=00; "dir risks-*.*" gives directory; "bye" logs out. The COLON in "CD RISKS:" is essential. "CRVAX.SRI.COM" = "128.18.10.1". =CarriageReturn; FTPs may differ; UNIX prompts for username, password. ALL CONTRIBUTIONS CONSIDERED AS PERSONAL COMMENTS; USUAL DISCLAIMERS APPLY. Relevant contributions may appear in the RISKS section of regular issues of ACM SIGSOFT's SOFTWARE ENGINEERING NOTES, unless you state otherwise. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Thu, 2 Apr 92 9:08:13 PST From: "Peter G. Neumann" Subject: William Gibson, An (On-Line) Book of the Dead William Gibson, well known for his "Neuromancer" (which in 1986 anticipated what is today known as virtual reality), has a new book, "Agrippa (A Book of the Dead)" that apparently will be available ONLY in computer-diskette form, according to Entertainment Weekly. As reported in the San Francisco Chronicle (31 Mar 1992, p.D3), "Gibson plans to infect the disk with a virus that will make it impossible to transfer the text to paper." This supposed "virus" (more like a logic bomb or a confinement lock?) will undoubtably present an interesting challenge to MSDOS crackers, antiviralists, virtual realists, and foreign ripoffs. If it were to run on Unix, where you can external to the program trivially pipe the output to a file, at least the text would be easy to capture. However, perhaps this is really a situation in which it is the graphical screen image that is relevant rather than the words. Digitized sound would also make it hard to transfer to paper. There is also the likelihood that a succession of home-grown purgated editions might appear, with incremental changes in the dialogue, visuals, and plot line. You don't like the ending? You want pornographic augmentations? Roll your own modifications! Tinkering is generally easier than creating in the first place. So, the book also needs some sort of integrity lock (checksum or crypto seal [is a sea-lion a cryptoseal?]) to provide tamper detection; however, many such schemes can be defeated by careful modifications that continue to satisfy the check. But, if Gibson has come up with an interactive, interpretively developed book that creates its own virtual reality on the screen, that could be quite an exciting development. [Note: It is important not to confuse the SF Chronicle noted above with the other publication with the same handle, the Science Fiction Chronicle, although sometimes it is hard to tell the difference.] ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 2 Apr 92 9:23:37 PST From: "Peter G. Neumann" Subject: NSA and cryptographic software The NSA and the Software Publishers' Association appear to have reached an agreement that would allow some exports of cryptographic software, as long as the keys are constrained to be sufficiently short. The net effect is a slight but potentially useful improvement over what was previously exportable. [Source: An article, NSA May Loosen Curbs on Software Sales Abroad, by Don Clark, Chronicle Staff Writer, San Francisco Chronicle, 24 Mar 1992, p.C1] Now that NSA and RSA have come a little closer, we need to bring in BSA (the Boy Scouts of America). Be prepared! Imagine, a merit badge for cryptography? [For some background on RSA, see Burt Kaliski's contribution on the free (to noncommercial users) RSAREF privacy-enhanced mail toolkit, RISKS-13.22.] ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 2 Apr 92 08:02:29 CST From: jbrown@phoebus.ncsc.navy.mil (Jay Brown) Subject: US Navy radar jammers pass test despite software errors There was a report last week on CNN Headline News about the US Navy improperly certifying radar jamming equipment for Navy jets (I think the F-14 and the F/A-18 were mentioned). According to the report, the Navy tested and certified these jammers despite the fact that the equipment failed several tests or did not meet all the criteria for certification. As a consequence, some congressional subcommittee or another was investigating the Navy's certification procedures. The Navy's excuse for certifying these systems despite the failed tests was to blame the failures on software errors, according to the report. The report did not mention who manufactured the radar jammers or who wrote the software in question. -- John L. Brown, jbrown@phoebus.ncsc.navy.mil ------------------------------ Date: Sat, 28 Mar 92 12:16:32 MST From: jsloan@niwot.scd.ucar.EDU (John Sloan) Subject: Newsweek, March 23,1992, on SDI The March 23, 1992 edition of _Newsweek_ features an article critical of research related to the Strategic Defense Initiative. The article is titled "Safety Net Full of Holes" (pp. 56-59), written by Sharon Begley and Daniel Glick. It contains this reassuring passage: "[The] Pentagon disagrees that deploying a space- and ground-based defense system poses significant technical challenges. The complexity of the software required to coordinate Star Wars, for instance, is no more daunting than programs that control nuclear reactors, it says." Now we can all breath a sigh of relief. [ All typos are mine. ] John Sloan, NCAR/SCD, jsloan@ncar.ucar.edu ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 2 Apr 92 03:03:19 PST From: desint!geoff@uunet.UU.NET (Geoff Kuenning) Subject: A remarkably stupid design decision I just had to pass this one on because it was so funny/sad. A client told me today of a consultant who designed a menu-driven system to be used by accountants for financial purposes. Needing a special character to signify "return to main menu", he chose one that "nobody uses" (his words). The character? The dollar sign! Needless to say, on the first day the software was installed, my client got a frantic call. "Every time I try to enter a dollar amount, it pops me back to the menu!" Sigh. Geoff Kuenning geoff@ITcorp.com uunet!desint!geoff ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 2 Apr 1992 06:15:04 PST From: MJackson.wbst147@xerox.com (Mark Jackson) Subject: Risk of "parameter validation" hype So Microsoft is touting "parameter validation" as a bold new innovation. You forgot to cite the obvious Risk: someone's inevitable attempt to *patent* parameter validation. . . ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 2 Apr 92 10:13:21 EST From: "Daniel B. Dobkin" Subject: Re: FBI v. digital phones (Kantor, RISKS 13.32) Brian Kantor notes that a monitoring capability is an essential diagnostic element of any telephone switch, digital or analog. He suggests that the only purpose conceivable for a law such as the FBI proposes is to enable wiretaps without Telco cooperation; this in turn is most likely to occur when the FBI doesn't have a proper warrant, either. Hence, "[W]hat they are asking for is the ability to make warrantless taps." In fairness to the FBI, there are other possibilities, such as when a Telco employee is himself the subject of an investigation. Not much, I agree, but let's try to assume that the Bureau's motivation is pure, even if its proposed implementation isn't. ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 1 Apr 92 22:37:48 -0500 From: padgett@tccslr.dnet.mmc.com (A. Padgett Peterson) Subject: Laws to Ease Wiretapping This makes the second time in recent months we have heard of government initiatives to make wiretapping of data traffic easier. Interestinly, there are a couple of companies currently working on devices (and must admit I have been prodding them for a couple of years) that should make it an order of magnitude more difficult: For some time now, I have been concerned about tapping, particularly when performing my daily security duties while at conferences. Currently I rely on a "smart card" or dynamic access device for one-time passwords to avoid spoofing. About two years ago the following thought crossed my mind: Years ago when maintaining KY-26 cryptographic equipment, (my AFSC was 306mop0) brave souls used to bring up encrypted channels "blind" to minimise time away from the poker game. Instead of changing the transmit side first and using the receive side to verify reception, we used to change both sides at once by taking a pre-established count to go "bravo india" and create a synchronized duplex connection. If we could communicate, we would know that it had worked (what was done if it did not is not disclosable but involved the butt end of a large screwdriver). Similarly, a couple of years ago I was talking to one of the major vendors of "dynamic access control devices" about use to provide full encryption of all traffic. Currently, the way such a system works is that when a login occurs, the host sends out a multi-digit "challenge". In my case, I enter the challenge followed by a PIN into a card which then calculates a reply. I send back the reply as a password that lets me into the system. What I postulated was that instead of sending the reply back to the host, it be fed into my laptop as the seed for encryption. The laptop then sends a "bravo india" to the host telling it to start encryption. Since the host knows what the reply should be, it uses that as its own seed. If both sides are then able to communicate, they authenticate each other simultaneously while providing full encryption of all following traffic. One of the major problems was loss of synch from line noise, but the current crop of error-correcting modems has made such encryption not only feasible but also easy and at whatever level (DES, RSA, ...) is desired. ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 30 Mar 92 12:56:51 BST From: Brian.Randell@newcastle.ac.uk Subject: Re: Aviation Software Certification Last month I sent to RISKs a copy of an article that appeared in the (UK) Computer Weekly on 6 February which carried the headline "Experts warned CAA before Airbus disaster". Attached is a letter, from the experts concerned, complaining at this article. This letter was I understand published by Computer Weekly on February 13, and has just been drawn to my attention. Despite the delay, I suggest that it be included in RISKs, in view of the comments it makes on the original article. Brian Randell ----------- AIRBUS SOFTWARE IN THE CLEAR We are the three BCS "software experts" who visited the CAA in January to discuss the new draft standard for software in aircraft systems D0-178B. We believe that it is misleading that you linked our technical visit to the CAA to the subsequent A320 Airbus crash. There is no evidence of any fault in any safety-critical software on the A320 Airbus crash. It is too early to know the causes of the crash and irresponsible to imply that we were in any way trying to "warn the CAA" about the A320. Our concerns about the draft D0-178B are technical and relate to its inadequacy as a basis for objective certification of the reliability of software in airborne systems. All modern passenger aircraft contain safety-critical software and our comments to the CAA did not relate to any specific aircraft. The CAA received our comments constructively and readily agreed to pass each criticism to the international team which is reviewing the draft standard. Bev Littlewood, Martyn Thomas, Brian Wichmannn Computing Laboratory, The University, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 7RU, UK EMAIL = Brian.Randell@newcastle.ac.uk PHONE = +44 91 222 7923 FAX = +44 91 222 8232 ------------------------------ Date: 2 Apr 92 02:34:52 GMT From: eric@snark.thyrsus.com (Eric S. Raymond) Subject: WAR GAMES II WAR GAMES II or How I Learned To Start Worrying and Hate The Bomb [posted to comp.risks; an incomplete version previously went to other groups] Some of my friends call me an `improbability vortex' --- the kind of person weird stuff just naturally happens around. Occasionally I manage to to forget why; my life doesn't seem bizarre to *me*. Then, something happens to remind me... Wednesday, March 25 1992: a fairly ordinary day in the life of Eric Raymond, Boy Hacker. Shower, read netnews, phone calls, some revision on the clone hardware buyer's guide I've been working on for comp.unix.sysv386. Will the top ten vendors go for my idea of a competitive "UNIX Dream Machines Bake-Off"? Hmm...well, Swan Tech wants to sign up, that's a start. Ah, the mail's in. Riffle, riffle. What's this? Forwarded from MIT Press. Something about the book, no doubt... The Book: if you don't know it already, I edited a lexicon called _The_New_Hacker's_Dictionary_ (MIT Press, 1991, ISBN 0-262-68069-6). It's all about hacker language and folklore. Sold 14,000 copies in its first seven months, got rave reviews everywhere, good stuff like that. Got my first nut-case letter about a month back --- always heard that was supposed to happen to authors. Some of the fallout has been weird. Ouch, fallout --- *bad* choice of words. Back to our story. Hm. From ISPNews. INFOSecurity Product News. Eh? Never heard of them; sounds like some trade rag for professional paranoids. Computer form on the inside; addressed to ERIC RAYMOND EDITOR, THE MIT PRESS, MASS INST OF TECHNOLOGY, CAMBRIDGE MA 02142. I see what happened; the Press's editorial address miscegenated with my book credit in someone's mailing-list software, and some clerical droid at the Press didn't look at content and forwarded a piece of mail that should have stayed in-house. What we've got here is, oh, yeah, must be a report from the magazine's bingo card. Reader service; they circle numbers, you get a bunch of product info requests. OK, who wants to know about my book? Maybe I'll give them a surprise and answer it myself. They probably all think the book is a how-to manual for crackers. Damn all journalists for what they did to the word "hacker", anyhow... There were four. First one: DAVID CARGILL SYSTEMS A GUARDIAN LIFE INS STE 201 888 SEVENTH AVE NEW YORK NY 10106 Oh, boring, I thought to myself. Actually he turned out not to be; I spoke with him, later, and the guy turns out to be an old UNIX hand who, when I explained what the book is really about, cheerfully expatiated on Cargill's Theory of Fat Electrons. See, Con Edison sucks its line current out of the big generators with a pair of coil taps located near the top of the dynamo. When the normal tap brushes get dirty, they take 'em off line to clean up, and use special auxilliary taps on the *bottom* of the coil. Now (sez Cargill) this is a problem, because when they do that they get not ordinary or `thin' electrons, but the fat'n'sloppy electrons that are heavier and so settle to the bottom of the generator. These flow down ordinary wires OK, but when they have to turn a sharp corner (like in an IC via) they get stuck. This is what causes computer glitches. I laughed, said "You sound like a man who wants to hear about {quantum bogodynamics}" and directed him to the on-line version of the book at prep. Back to our story... Next guy... BRADLEY H EDWARDS SEC SPE SECURITY-SAFETY CONSULTS PO BOX 536 TOPEKA KS 66601 Well, the phone number attached to this one was out of service. Security Specialist, eh? For sure he's got the cracker/hacker bug on the brain. Then my eyeballs tripped over the third address PAMELA D MILLER CHIEF USSPACE COM STOP 4 J2C/SS0-C CHEYENNE MTN AFB CO 80914 and I went into the mental equivalent of TILT TILT TILT. Now, any of you who ain't congenital idiots raised in a rain barrel somewhere on the butt-end of nowhere will already have decoded that address to "U.S. Space Command, Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Base". Yeah, that's right. NORAD; the big tunnel complex under the mountain from which they be plannin' to fight World War III if it ever goes down. Huge walls of blinkenlights, 30-foot-thick blast doors, "We could tell you, sir, but then we'd have to kill you", the whole weird trip. Cornpone accents with their fingers on the pulse of the Apocalypse. Oh, *man*, I said to myself. I have to talk to this woman. I haven't forgotten the nationwide media flap after _War_Games_ came out. You remember, that silly movie where the kid with the voice-controlled IMSAI (snort) cracks into NORAD's computers and accidentally damn near starts a nuclear war? God damn; I'll bet the plot of that sucker is seared into the collective psyche of every security officer at Cheyenne Mountain, they probably screen the video every couple months just to keep the newbies on their toes. What kind of hideous Federal heat could land on me if PAMELA D MILLER has hacker/cracker confusion on the brain? I imagine some steel-eyed amazon in a blue suit exuding grim determination to Nip This Menace In The Bud. *Bad* scene for a guy who is, after all, better known in some circles for practising witchcraft and stone anarchist-loony politics than for The Book. Yiiiii ... visions of sinister limos and Men In Black pulling up to my front porch. "We want to ask you a few questions, sir." So I called my editor Terri and Guy Steele (credited coauthor) and told them all the proceedings so far. Nervous laughter all around. Lugubrious jokes. I need to convince this woman and her unknown masters that I'm a *harmless* lunatic. Time to track PAMELA D to her lair. (Yes. Think of her that way, Pamela D., like one of those impossible anonymous synthetic blondes in an upscale skin magazine. "Well, I'm into sailing Sunfishes and I really like kids, you know?". Good. A *much* less threatening mental tableau.) I limber up my phoning fingers and call the number blazoned above her address. "NORAD operator ten. What extension?" Gulp. "Uh, I'm trying to reach Pamela D. Miller? I got a product information query from her." "Do you have an extension, sir?" "Um, no I don't. Just this number. And her address." I reel it off. "Try the base locator at Peterson, sir. 554-4020." "Thanks", I said, and hung up." Ohhh-kay. NORAD for sure. Hail Eris! PAMELA D's hanging out somewhere under a couple of cubic miles of rock, likely in some cramped little office with 1950s-era furniture and walls painted institutional puke-green. And an old-style black phone. (How long has it been since you've seen a black phone?) (Trust me, this is what the military version of bureaucratic rabbit warrens looks like.) Or maybe at some gleaming console watching telemetry from all those KH-11s we're supposed to pretend don't exist. Hah. Heads up, Pammy; constructive chaos is about to enter your life. All hail Discordia! This is about where things started to get really Kafkaesque. The base locator is their directory information desk. I ask for Pamela D. Miller's extension and get 3247 (remember that number). I call it. Some guy who sounds exactly like Andy Griffith answers: " Morrow", I say I'm looking for Pamela D. Miller and he says "You want 3427". O.K. I call 3427. Busy signal. Bummer. The thrill of the hunt having took hold, I feel rather frustrated. I go off and do other things for fifteen minutes or so --- polishing the draft rules for the Dream Machines Bake-Off. I call again. Busy signal. Bummer again. Lunch, some code-bashing, and about six or seven cycles of this later I begin to suspect evil things. Either this woman spends more continuous time on the phone than your average Hollywood lawyer or I've got a wrong number. Or she doesn't actually exist. In your typical government agency she could have died with the phoneset in her hand in 1974 and nobody'd have got around to noticing it was off the hook yet. On the other hand, *somebody* had to fill out that product-bingo card. On my next try, when the operator says "Busy, sir." I explain that the number's been continuously so for several hours, and this seems unlikely. "I'll check for an alternate. Try 3052." Right. No one answers at 3052. I hang up and answer some email. I try again. No answer. Again, fifteen minutes later. No answer. Oy vey. Isn't this where I got on? So I try 3247 (the *original* number) again. Busy. Foo. I call the base locator people again and explain that there appears to be some confusion in the air. Is it 3247 or 3427? And what's with this 3052 jazz? "I have 3247 listed, sir. I'll double-check. It says 3427 on her card." Silence. "Well, which is it?" I say. "3427. But it says 3247 on the roster." "Well", I say with enormous gentleness, "don't you think you ought to consider *fixing* it?" The silence of blank incomprehension on the other end. Never ask a droid to exceed its programming; it wastes your time and annoys the droid. I hang up. And try 3427 again. Busy... A few cycles later I conclude this isn't working; it's time to drop back and punt. I consider everything I know about bureaucracies, call the locator people and confidently ask for the US Space Command main administration number. "Um, there doesn't seem to be one, sir. Oh, wait, you can try this one." She gives out with a string of numbers. "Can you transfer me?" "Stand by." (...only in the military) "AF Space Command." I go into my spiel about PAMELA D. and her inquiry and her address. "Uh, that's a Cheyenne Mountain address. Can't help you with that." "Um", I said, "this *is* US Space Command?" "No sir, this is AF Space Command. Separate organization. We're on the base; they're under the mountain." "Two *separate* Space Commands?" I said. "Why two?" I can't tell you what he said, because I didn't understand the resulting freshet of bureaucratese. A couple of requests for clarification just got me in deeper. I caught something about "functional separation" and strings of building numbers about as intelligible as so many Egyptian hieroglyphs. Struggling my way out of this verbal morass, I said, "Well, where do I go from here?" "Lemme see if I can send you over to someone that'll help", he says, and gives me another number. It's mid-afternoon now and I'm starting to lose it. Fifteen hundred miles from these people and I feel as thoroughly trapped in their maze as though I was physically under that bloody mountain. Theseus with no Ariadne and a nuclear-security Minotaur lurking around the next bend. (I like my mixed metaphors shaken, not stirred, thank you.) PAMELA D, where are you? But I call this guy's number and get the most human-sounding voice yet. "Base information", it says. Young, female, black, rather pretty if that lilt isn't out of sync with her looks. Quite a change from the depersonalized midwestern/southern whitebread twangs I've been hearing. She listens sympathetically as I recount my tale of woe. "Well, let's see what I can do for you." "That's strange. I have no listing for a Pamela Miller." If there were any justice in the world there'd have been eerie, sinister music on the soundtrack just then. Slowly building towards the Moment of Discovery. Wait for it. At the time, a slight but definite premonitory chill ran down my spine. "Well. Does this mail code mean anything to you? J2C/SSO-C?" "Yes sir, it means she's in J2 section." "O.K., what does J2 do? What does that say about her job?" Long pause. "She's in intel, sir." Jangling chords and screaming brass from the unseen orchestra. Oh, *great*. All the paranoid fantasies that'd been slowly graying out as I threaded my way through the labyrinth sprang back to full and colorful life. The *intelligence* group. Better and better. I thought about buzzing Guy and asking him if he was on good terms with any of his overseas relatives. "A spook!" I said, and laughed rather hollowly. "No wonder I've had trouble reaching her. What do I try next?" Perhaps ominously, the woman did not elect to contradict my choice of terms. "I'll see if I can reach anyone at J2 who knows her", she said. Long pause. Long, long pause. Background noises; people coughing, murmured speech, file doors banging. Finally, anticlimax. "I found her. That's 2nd Lt. Miller, sir; I don't know why she'd have "CHIEF" after her name. Her extension is 3433, but she's on detached duty and won't be back till Monday." And there you have it. It's 2:39 the following morning and I look like an out-take from the "Nightfly" cover --- but if I disappear mysteriously, y'all will *know* where to start. TO BE CONTINUED... (Interlude, Friday morning. My father reads an uploaded version of the above and asks if I intend to post it. Upon learning that I already have, he soberly advises against offending the entire U.S. Air Force. "After all," he observes, "they could drop a smart bomb down your chimney." Gee. Thanks, Dad.) Monday morning, March 30th: Once more into the breach --- and Pamela D. Miller is real! Got her first time. Neither amazon nor bimbo, of course, but a bright and generous-minded lady with a sense of humor. And a *1st* lieutenant now. She turns out to be (no less) chief of computer security at NORAD; and (mirabile dictu) she *knows* the difference between a hacker and a cracker. *Vast* sigh of relief --- no snatch teams in my future and I can unstop my chimney now. She was hip enough to laugh when I told her something of my travails last Wednesday, laugh harder when I told her the title of this posting, and hardest when I volunteered to autograph her copy of TNHD with an inscription reading "I will not start World War III. I will not start World War III. I will not start World War III...." She's not allowed to have a direct phone line, much less an Internet address (think about it) so this mini-epic is going to have to go to her by snail-mail. But I've been invited to tour NORAD and (yes, it is possible) visit the War Room if I'm ever out Colorado way... --- RISKS moral. Gotta have a RISKS moral for this story. Well, there are a couple. The trivial one is, watch out for aliasing problems if you ever edit a book; we've only got one word for several different kinds of `editor', and that high-level difference may not be visible to computers or the clerical help. A less trivial one is "Don't be paranoid; it encourages paranoia in others.". I had fun writing the above; I've always enjoyed the mad-genius-on-speed style as practised by Robert Anton Wilson, Tom Robbins, Hunter Thompson at. al. --- but if Lt. Miller were that wiggy or I'd really approached her with The Fear dripping from my every vocal overtone, things could've got ugly (hah! little did she suspect that I kept her on the phone only long enough for my insidious infrasonic acoustic virus to escape from her earpiece and set up *sinister resonances* in any nearby electronic equipment...) The least trivial of all is that *human* networking is still our most effective tool for some important kinds of risk reduction. Mutual trust, when you can establish it, is the best security. You guess; am I more or less worried now about the risks inherent in having something like NORAD exist, having got a little acquainted with Lt. Miller? Are *you* more or less worried after reading this story? And, which is the real point, does this posting make it more or *less* likely that someone with the requisite skills would actually try to crack NORAD? Eric S. Raymond = eric@snark.thyrsus.com (breathing easier in Malvern) ------------------------------ End of RISKS-FORUM Digest 13.33 ************************