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No amount of material indirection can make material states seem experiential, just as no number of extra speakers can make a stereo seem like a television: the two domains are just incommensurable.
What is the evidence of this claim? It seems pretty common, but I don't see why I should accept it.
For instance, it seems pretty clear that no amount of CPU speed will make your CPU capable of true parallelism, and yet with context switching our CPU *gives a convincing illusion of parallelism*.
And this is a pretty apt analogy, because the mechanistic attention schema theory of consciousness[1] suggests something similar is happening to produce the illusion of subjective experience, ie. rapid context switching attention between internal and external models of the world.
1: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00500/full
There's nothing here!