113 upvotes, 11 direct replies (showing 11)
According to materialism (at least according to the version Daniel Dennett holds and is being discussed in the article) that question is circular because the term "perceive" relies on an internal-external world dualism akin to the Cartesian theater[1]. According to this materialist view there is no central "I" to do any perceiving, no homunculus inside our skull. A materialist might use the word "perceive" but would simply mean "neurons process environmental information" or something similar.
1: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cartesian_theater
Comment by HeraclitusMadman at 16/01/2020 at 19:09 UTC
50 upvotes, 4 direct replies
So would we describe a river as the infinitely falling torrent of water, or is it a single thing? Is there any discriminate nature to be had by such things which are fluid with time, but known in themselves?
Comment by [deleted] at 17/01/2020 at 01:06 UTC*
8 upvotes, 2 direct replies
[deleted]
Comment by DannyDannDanDaD at 17/01/2020 at 07:37 UTC*
4 upvotes, 2 direct replies
But we can perceive and observe our own thoughts and dreams (lucid dreaming). How would a materialist explain this?
How is it that we can see, hear, taste, touch, smell things that are not present externally within a dream?
Comment by RustNeverSleeps77 at 17/01/2020 at 01:48 UTC
3 upvotes, 1 direct replies
Well what's doing the information processing if there is no "I"?
Comment by ReaperReader at 17/01/2020 at 08:56 UTC
3 upvotes, 1 direct replies
But what if the word "perceive" doesn't rely on an internal-external world dualism (etc)? Small kids use words like "see" and "hear" all the time and I doubt very much that many of them have the slightest idea about internal-external world dualism, let alone Cartesian Theatre.
According to this materialist view there is no central "I" to do any perceiving, no homunculus inside our skull.
So what if we perceive things via a decentralised I?
Comment by aptmnt_ at 17/01/2020 at 05:12 UTC
3 upvotes, 1 direct replies
there is no central "I" to do any perceiving, no homunculus inside our skull
What an ugly straw man you've smuggled into the discussion. Perception does not necessitate a central homunculus.
A materialist might use the word "perceive" but would simply mean "process environmental information" or something similar.
Then a materialist account would be incomplete. There is a lot of processing that goes on in a human body, from nervous processing that runs autonomous systems to DNA replication and chemical and hormonal processing. Only a subset of the whole of these processes are subject to conscious interrogation. One can't introspect and report on the state of protein synthesis within their own body, but could easily offer a description of visible objects. It seems some forms of processing are able to be consciously perceived, and others are not.
Comment by Linus_Naumann at 16/01/2020 at 19:50 UTC
10 upvotes, 3 direct replies
I dont know man, I find it kind of funny when people try to deny the very basis of everything they ever experienced. I mean, who experiences the illusion? Everything you ever experienced was the content of your consciousness.
Just like the author, I never encountered a good argument of why consciousness should be a product of unconscious matter. Usually they confuse input-output dynamics for consciousness (but only if it results in complicated behavior! If its just a stone reacting to light by heating up it doesnt count).
Comment by marianoes at 16/01/2020 at 19:22 UTC
3 upvotes, 1 direct replies
Isnt that basically what qualia is? Also electricity is a state of matter. Couldnt one say conciousness lies in a state of electrical conductivity.
Comment by GuyWithLag at 17/01/2020 at 08:19 UTC
1 upvotes, 1 direct replies
He never heard of virtualization?
(apologies for the low-effort comment)
Comment by [deleted] at 17/01/2020 at 05:51 UTC*
1 upvotes, 1 direct replies
[deleted]
Comment by Vince_McLeod at 17/01/2020 at 06:23 UTC
0 upvotes, 1 direct replies
Consciousness isn't inside the skull.