1 upvotes, 1 direct replies (showing 1)
A fundamental problem I have with utilitarianism, in general, is the choice of metric. Often simplified to "the most good for the most people", and generally in the context of happiness or pleasure, the metric hinges on something particularly unattainable. The human desire for happiness or pleasure is insatiable, and so there's no way to optimize the utility function.
On the other hand, if the utility function were to reduce as much evil as possible, this creates a baseline at zero. While it may, in fact, be impossible to eliminate pain altogether, at least 0 is a tangible point on the number line, something we can at least measure against.
In a conversation with a colleague, he asserted that Mill's view was to do both, provide the most amount of good for the most people WHILE eliminating as much evil (i.e., pain) as possible for the most people. I contend that's a misreading of Bentham, that Bentham asserted you can do one, or the other, but not both. My colleague had a difficult time understanding that, when you attempt policies that strive to do both you inevitably end up with problems of nonlinearity that are not readily solved.
In the case of Parfit, the "repugnant conclusion" stands so long as we attempt to attain, in absolute value, "the most good". However, if we reverse the metric, to attain the least evil, the problem with absolute values is still a problem. Is attempting to eliminate evil for 100,000 people not better than attempting to eliminate evil for 100? The more people there are, the more evil you're preventing/eliminating, in absolute terms. This conclusion serves to reinforce continuous population growth, as well.
What, then, is the solution? Well, it seems particularly obvious to step away from absolute values. Attaining lower ratios of people suffering evil/pain should be the metric by which we measure utility. Using the attainment of good/pleasure, even as a ratio, still falls prey to the problem of insatiability.
Comment by camilo16 at 14/01/2020 at 15:43 UTC
2 upvotes, 1 direct replies
The whole problem of moralistic ethics is that it assumes its own conclusion. The only reason we consider these questions in the first place is that we are empathetic by nature. In other words, we are biologically predisposed to avoid our own suffering and that of others. So of course all moral ethical frameworks base themselves on the idea of minimizing suffering and maximizing happiness, that's our biological imperative.
But suffering isn't something to be avoided, it's just a reaction to a given environment. From your perspective, your hand burning is immeasurable suffering, from the perspective of the universe, it's just fuel combusting.
These ethics detach themselves from our biology and then build gigantic theoretical frameworks over a set of assumptions that was naively picked in the first place.