Comment by spacecadet84 on 14/01/2020 at 10:22 UTC

65 upvotes, 5 direct replies (showing 5)

View submission: On population ethics, the development of Derek Parfit's thought, and the origin of Parfit's "repugnant conclusion"

Maybe I'm just not 'philosophical' enough, but I feel comfortable dismissing "the repugnant conclusion" as a conceptual plaything.

To me it seems obvious that an ecologically intact world of 500 million people living rich happy lives is immeasurably preferable to a ravaged dystopia of 50 billion miserable wretches, in the same way I prefer kids not to get leukemia. If anybody disagrees on philosophical grounds, all that demonstrates to me is that an intellectual obsession with abstraction causes some people to lose touch with reality.

Not denigrating philosophy here, just saying it has a few rabbit-holes that don't lead anywhere useful.

Replies

Comment by DarkMarxSoul at 14/01/2020 at 11:24 UTC

32 upvotes, 4 direct replies

I'm fairly sure that's the point of the Repugnant Conclusion. It highlights that under utilitarianism the 50 billion miserable wretches would be morally preferable, when this is evidently not true.

Comment by [deleted] at 14/01/2020 at 14:12 UTC

4 upvotes, 0 direct replies

Well, a particularly important aspect of philosophy are "thought experiments", which the "repugnant conclusion" is the conclusion of one such case. Thought experiments set the variables in a particular way. You then apply your moral theory, and, in accordance with the way you've set your variables, assess the outcomes.

IF* your variables contend that the "most good", measured in absolute terms, is the preferred option, then, stepping through utilitiarianism, which seeks to optimize utility (in this case, the most absolute good), the natural conclusion is the "repugnant conclusion". Numerically speaking, 50 billion wretches each with 1 unit of "good" is, in absolute terms, *just as morally good* as 500 million people with 100 units of "good" (both "units of good" amounting to 50 billion).

I think we can see why this is a problem, which is why the "repugnant conclusion" is, well, *repugnant*.

So, what do philosophers do? Reframe the thought exercise and try to find ways that make things better. For instance, instead of assuming an absolute value of good for the utility function, how about assuming a ratio of those suffering abject evil to those that don't? At least that you can optimize (eliminating evil reduces it to zero, whereas pursuing good is infinitely unattainable).

Comment by Shield_Lyger at 14/01/2020 at 15:49 UTC

2 upvotes, 0 direct replies

To me it seems obvious that an ecologically intact world of 500 million people living rich happy lives is immeasurably preferable to a ravaged dystopia of 50 billion miserable wretches, in the same way I prefer kids not to get leukemia.

Is it better then, to abort the children who may develop leukemia, and focus on the others? Or does the child with leukemia also have a life worth living? My understanding is that "the repugnant conclusion" presupposes that all of the lives in question are worth living. If your "ravaged dystopia of 50 billion miserable wretches" don't find their lives worthwhile, they they wouldn't factor into the repugnant conclusion.

Comment by Dora_Bowl at 14/01/2020 at 14:54 UTC

1 upvotes, 0 direct replies

They do live in a miserable dystopia. Parfit says it is a world of “muzak and potatoes”. There is also practical considerations about this problem even though it is abstract.

It just does not seem like you are familiar with the problem.

Comment by LifeinBath at 14/01/2020 at 15:53 UTC

1 upvotes, 0 direct replies

Have you read through the argument? Can you point out where it goes wrong? And it wouldn't be 'miserable wretches' - that really would be worse - it is lives barely worth living - i.e. fairly drab lives with some balanced mix of joys and sorrows.