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View submission: Logic has no foundation - except in metaphysics. Hegel explains why.
For how imprecise and generalizing the article can be, and although there is a mention of "logocentrism" the view in the article isn't really postmodernist or deconstrcutionist in neither its intents, nor its references. Neither Hegel nor Priest's dialetheism - who also has "realist" ontological and teleological ambitions and uses formal logica at a high degree of sophistication - fall right under this category. I am persoally not an hegelian, I find him often unclear and, abstruse, I prefer analytical philosophy's writing style and methods very much in general- but Hegel just isn't a postmodern or a deconstructionist by any means - not anymore than Plato, Plotinus or even Aristotle could be, as they also claimed some kind priority of a "metaphysical reality" over formal quantification and extensionalism. It would be deeply anachronistic to state such a thing and, in fact, false.
Hegel is a modernist. With some romantic aspects, but he is a modernist. He is at the intersection of idealism and realism, he was interrested in mathematics, science and human action in general and constructed a kind of discourse with an emphasis on the triumph of rationality through history - that is precisely the kind of "metanarrative" deconstructionist and postmodernist discourses are elaborated against (in Lyotard's postdmodern condition, Hegel is much of an adversary, for instance, the teleological perspective on reason's self-actualization through history is typically the kind of metanarrative opposed to there).
There is a reason why logicians such as Charles Sanders Peirce, analytic philosophers such as John McDowell or mathematicians such as Lawyere were inspired by parts of his thoughts (and his treatment of logic) - the problems Hegel typically tried to resolve - for instance concerning the opposition of contingency and necessity, finite and infinite, immediacy and mediation, indeterminacy and determinacy, the limits of the intuitionist account of conceptual objects (for instance in mathmatics) and their material "experimental" contents, the relation of the discrete conceptualization and the continuity of change, the continuum of their "global" reality - are still quite interesting from a logical standpoint although his language can be very obscure and convoluted, and differs from the standards of analytic extensionalist/quantitative logic. I think it is however quite a stretch to say it brings nothing to the table.
There's nothing here!