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View submission: What drives the dialectic: Hegel's transition from being to nothing
It isn’t driven by “pure negation” in the sense that Trendelenburg is defining it.
I think the “real opposition” thing is less of a problem for Hegel because there are some assumptions that negation is morally robust (found already in Kant’s account of disjunction), but the problem is more how we arrive at the unity of opposites, which is where determinate negation comes in. Like, the inference from being to nothing as what is “not being” is justified if you take the negation to be modal (if something in no way is, then it necessarily is not), but the inference from “being is nothing” to “becoming” requires that contradiction does not result in a nullity, but can be a real determination of things. Trendelenburg thinks that requires the experience of motion, whereas Hegel thinks that this is self-evident to reason if we example any number of dialectical examples carefully.
There's nothing here!