1 upvotes, 1 direct replies (showing 1)
View submission: The irony of determinism
What the…
Dude. There is serious discussion of metaphysics and just basic physics and logic…
…and then there is the appeal to consequences.
Are you accusing us of not considering the consequences when we analyze reality? And accusing us of not changing the way we see reality so that we can avoid “ironic” consequences?
I mean, thank you, I guess?
As a hard incompatibilist I don’t even think about determinism. To me that’s lower level freshman version of the free will skepticism I’ve come to master. There is no BDMR whether determinism is true or not. This is self evident. And your feelings, or the consequences of believing this have nothing to do with whether it’s true.
It’s valid to want to discuss the feelings and consequences about free will skepticism, but we ought not do it in the same sandpit where we decide it is true or not. This is a totally different discussion.
Even Dennett made this mistake. Played the Pragmatist card in his final hand. Just shows how serious this topic is, if even the big D couldn’t hold it together.
Comment by diogenesthehopeful at 23/08/2024 at 07:16 UTC
1 upvotes, 1 direct replies
As a hard incompatibilist I don’t even think about determinism
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-moral-responsibility/#HardInco[1][2]
1: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-moral-responsibility/#HardInco
2: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-moral-responsibility/#HardInco
One of these positions is *hard incompatibilism*, which maintains that whatever the fundamental nature of reality, whether it is deterministic *or* indeterministic, we lack basic desert moral responsibility. Hard incompatibilism amounts to a rejection of both compatibilism and libertarianism. It maintains that the sort of free will required for basic desert moral responsibility is incompatible with **causal determination** by factors beyond the agent’s control and *also* with the kind of indeterminism in action required by the most plausible versions of libertarianism (see Pereboom 2001, 2014a).
{italics: SEP bold: mine}
So you don't think about determinism. Do you believe a counterfactual can cause you to change your behavior? For over a year on this sub I've argued that causation is logical and determinism is logical plus chronological and local. I've argued that determinism puts space and time constraints on causality, so instead of you dudes dealing with my argument, you just deflect by saying we don't care about determinism any more. So what do you care about besides moral responsibility? If you can prove the disappearing agent disappears then you have something. However the self driving cars are coming and they cannot drive without agency. Therefore your disappearing agent is about the reappear and society is not ready for this. I'm not the only person that thinks about this even though you may believe what I believe doesn't matter:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EGDG3hgPNp8[3][4]
3: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EGDG3hgPNp8
4: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EGDG3hgPNp8
To drive a car the "disappearing agent" has to reappear in order to work with counterfactuals. It cannot wait until it runs down a pedestrian until is determines it should have done what it did. So while you are ignoring determinism, you might want to think more about counterfactuals. The philosophical zombie doesn't care about counterfactuals and only responds to the initial conditions at the time the so called decision is made.