2 upvotes, 1 direct replies (showing 1)
View submission: Is Pascal’s Wager still valid?
Pascal's original doesn't, I think, even if his 17th century readers would have taken it to be implied. Random laypersons might mention Hell, but the strong reconstruction above doesn't require it. Try it out, modify (c) to now read:
(c) the utility of not wagering for an orthodoxly conceived monotheistic god, if an orthodoxly conceived monotheistic god exists, is **negative infinity**
The conclusion 6 still follows, but is the argument any stronger for it? We could go through all of the objections and see if anything is changed:
-Other religions/gods/cooked-up scenarios can also hypothetically yield either infinite positive or negative utility.
-Before the modification, we might have had theological worries about belief translating into a positive reward. This modification now requires us to also accept belief translating into negative infinite utility, which is arguably even more theologically suspect. Perhaps this point deserves its own thread, but in short the worries have to do with God's benevolence. Is infinite punishment ever just? Is punishment based on one's beliefs morally permissible? Does this assume a kind of doxastic voluntarism? Would not annihilation be more just than an infinitely long negative experience? By modifying (c), we invite these complicated matters of ethical reasoning and Scriptural interpretation to enter the picture without any obvious benefit.
-Again, some would argue rationality does not require any particular assignment of utility to outcomes. They would argue that "it is not contrary to *reason* to prefer ___ to ____."
-Again, if one does not assign a positive probability to theism/Christianity/anything else, then the hypothetical infinite negative utility is inconsequential.
-Finally, problems with infinite utility would apply for positive or negative infinities.
Comment by femto97 at 25/03/2020 at 20:51 UTC
1 upvotes, 0 direct replies
Thanks for your reply.
I was just thinking that Pascal's Wager seems a bit more powerful to me in terms of punishment avoidance, since some might hold the view that pain avoidance should be prioritized over pleasure seeking.
For example, imagine two scenarios: in the first, you have a 50/50 chance of going to either heaven or hell after you die (assume infinite positive and negative utility, respectively), and in the second you have a 100% chance of going to neither. You just end.
I'd definitely pick the second of these options, and I'd feel much better about my life if the second of these were true. I think the argument can be made that the negative prospect of going to Hell far outweighs the positive prospect of going to Heaven.
This seems to align with prioritarian considerations (that increasing emphasis should be placed on the worst off, and once you are past a certain threshold of positive wellbeing it has much less normative significance to level you up any further)