https://www.reddit.com/r/askphilosophy/comments/2rx76q/questions_about_richard_price_and_desires/
created by drinka40tonight on 10/01/2015 at 01:45 UTC
2 upvotes, 1 top-level comments (showing 1)
Price says:
An object, such as fame, knowledge, or the welfare of a friend, is desired, not because we foresee that when obtained it will give us pleasure; but vice versa; obtaining it gives us pleasure because we previously desired it or had an affection carrying us to it and resting in it….It cannot be conceived, that obtaining what we do not desire, should be the cause of pleasure to us; or that what we are perfectly indifferent to... should… be the means of any kind of gratification.
How does one charitably understand this? I don't desire something because it gives me pleasure, but instead, I get pleasure because I desire it? What is Price talking about here? Surely I can get pleasure from shit that I have no desire for, right? Any historians or ethicists have any clue on how to parse this?
Comment by TychoCelchuuu at 10/01/2015 at 05:28 UTC
2 upvotes, 1 direct replies
Surely I can get pleasure from shit that I have no desire for, right?
He's not claiming that this is false. Price's assertion is this: if you desire something, then obtaining it will (at least typically) give you pleasure. The converse (if you don't desire something, obtaining it will *not* give you pleasure) is something he doesn't argue for, because, as you note, it's obviously false.
The point he *does* argue for, which is that we desire things like fame, knowledge, welfare for a friend, and so on not because we think they will bring us pleasure (imagine saying to a friend "I hope you ace that job interview - it will bring me lots of pleasure, you see, which is why I desire it!") but rather for more principled reasons. Of course, because we desire these things, when they obtain, they will bring us pleasure, but that's just a secondary characteristic of them.