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View submission: What exactly is wrong with falsificationism?
Criterion of Demarcation: The correct view is that falsifiability is a necessary but insufficient condition for being "scientific." On the other hand, being a "falsificationist" about the demarcation problem is to believe that falsifiability is both a necessary and sufficient condition for demarcating science.
If, with Laudan, we 'insist that any philosophically interesting demarcative device must distinguish scientific and non-scientific matters in a way which exhibits a surer epistemic warrant or evidential ground for science than for non-science,' then most falsificationists, I think, would agree that falsifiability is insufficient condition for demarcating science from nonscience. However, falsificationists tend not to insist on such 'epistemic warrant' or 'evidential ground', because they don't regard scientific status as a measure of justification, warrant, or confirmation. For them, to say that a theory is scientific doesn't speak of its past success, but rather its potential for failure in the future--it's forward rather than backward looking. That is, some theories are open to criticism or refutation by empirical testing and others are not, and those that are should be regarded as scientific--including very unsuccessful theories for which we have no epistemic warrant or evidential ground to believe.
Falsificationists usually present their criterion of science as a proposal for a convention or norm, and its intentionally broad, including both good and bad theories, so to prevent people fighting over the moniker of science. For falsificationists, to say that something is unscientific isn't a criticism, and to say that a theory is scientific isn't a compliment. There are good and bad of each; to speak of their scientific status is just to speak of how we might go a critical investigation of their content and possible truth.
There's nothing here!