8 upvotes, 1 direct replies (showing 1)
View submission: What exactly is wrong with falsificationism?
In my mind the biggest issue is in falsificationism's production of theories with predictive capability, a cornerstone of how science works. If we need to use a theory to predict data, say astrophysics, and we're using two models, neither falsified by the data, how should we know which one to use? Any appeal to a previous failure to falsify a theory is an appeal to induction. Appealing to the nature of the theory and its relative explanatory power is a creating certain epistemic privilege- this may be necessary or useful, but then again we lose the deductive element of the theory of falsificationism. The view presented seems incapable of deductive prediction in different circumstances, where multiple theories fit existing data, and so doesn't achieve its goals in this regard.
Another critique of falsificationism is that certain statements, like "for every metal, there is a temperature at which it will melt" are unfalsifiable, since if the metal doesn't melt at temperature T, then there is always temperature T+1 to consider. However, this seems a perfectly ordinary scientific hypothesis, which suggests falsificationism is inadequate as a scientific method.
Comment by alanforr at 10/10/2014 at 15:36 UTC
1 upvotes, 1 direct replies
If we need to use a theory to predict data, say astrophysics, and we're using two models, neither falsified by the data, how should we know which one to use?
If neither of them has been refuted you should do more work to try to refute one of them, or replace them both by some other idea.
Any appeal to a previous failure to falsify a theory is an appeal to induction.
No it's not. The theory does not refer to a particular place and time and say "I am false at this place and time, but that at that place and time". Any theory that did that would either have to explain why it applies in that way or it would be a bad explanation since it would have an unexplained qualification. So you guess the theory is true and if it stands up to tests then you have no reason not to use it for prediction. See "The Fabric of Reality" by David Deutsch, chapters 3 and 7.
Appealing to the nature of the theory and its relative explanatory power is a creating certain epistemic privilege- this may be necessary or useful, but then again we lose the deductive element of the theory of falsificationism.
That term is commonly associated with Karl Popper, who did not find it apt, see the introduction to "Realism and the Aim of Science". You create knowledge by noticing problems, guessing solutions, criticising the solutions until only one is left and then looking for a new problem. A criticism is any flaw in a theory.
Another critique of falsificationism is that certain statements, like "for every metal, there is a temperature at which it will melt" are unfalsifiable, since if the metal doesn't melt at temperature T, then there is always temperature T+1 to consider. However, this seems a perfectly ordinary scientific hypothesis, which suggests falsificationism is inadequate as a scientific method.
No physicist worth his salt would be caught dead saying anything like what you're suggesting. Rather, he would have an explanation of metals and this explanation would relate things like the melting point of the metal to its other properties. He would test the explanation which would not have as much wiggle room as you have given.
You don't have a good understanding of the position you're criticising. If you want a good understanding I suggest reading "Realism and the Aim of Science" by Karl Popper, especially the first chapter and "The Fabric of Reality" and "The Beginning of Infinity" by David Deutsch. You might also want to visit
www.fallibleideas.com.