TelePolis, Abu Ghraib.
Alle in Abu Ghraib bis hin zu Technikern und Köchen hätten allerdings gewusst, was auch er erfahren hat. Doch kaum einer habe es gewagt, während in den internen Untersuchungen weniger Wert auf Aufklärung denn auf Vertuschung und Eingrenzung gelegt worden sei. ¹
They link to Voice of America:
On issues ranging from abuses by some members of the military at Iraq’s Abu Ghraib prison, to CIA and FBI counter-terrorism efforts, whistleblowers have played a key role in bringing wrongdoing to the attention of Congress and the public.
They do so at great peril, but Republican Congressman Christopher Shays calls their courage in breaking bureaucratic ranks crucial to helping Congress and the public uncover corruption, fraud and waste:
“Seldom in our history has the need for the whistleblowers unfiltered voice been more urgent, particularly in the realms of national security and intelligence,” he said. ²
Since I talked about free speech with LionKimbro and BayleShanks on this site, let me reaffirm that *this* is the important part about free speech, as far as I am concerned. The question in recent discussion has been, whether any kind of limits on free speech can be extended to make this important job impossible.
(Discussion with Lion and Bayle: Comments on 2006-02-06 Islam Comics; related page on a law banning support for terrorism in Great Britain: 2006-02-16 Censorship.)
Comments on 2006-02-06 Islam Comics
Another TelePolis article links to the report of the UN Comission on Human Rights. ³ The chapters of the report (PDF):
1. The Legal Framework
2. Arbitrary Detention and Independence of Judges and Lawyers
3. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
4. Religious Intolerance
5. The Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health
6. Conclusions and Recommendations
I also find the following passages from the introduction telling:
1. In studying the situation, they have continuously sought the cooperation of the United States authorities and on 25 June 2004, they sent a letter, followed by several reminders, requesting the United States Government to allow them to visit Guantánamo Bay in order to gather first hand information from the prisoners themselves. By letter dated 28 October 2005, the Government of the United States of America extended an invitation for a one-day visit to three of the five mandate holders, inviting them “to visit the Department of Defense’s detention facilities [of Guantánamo Bay]”. The invitation stipulated that “the visit will not include private interviews or visits with detainees”. In their response to the Government dated 31 October 2005, the mandate holders accepted the invitation, including the short duration of the visit and the fact that only three of them were permitted access, and informed the United States Government that the visit was to be carried out on 6 December 2005. However, they did not accept the exclusion of private interviews with detainees, as that would contravene the terms of reference for fact-findings missions by special procedures and undermine the purpose of an objective and fair assessment of the situation of detainees held in Guantánamo Bay. In the absence of assurances from the Government that it would comply with the terms of reference, the mandate holders decided on 18 November 2005 to cancel the visit.
2. The present report is therefore based on the replies of the Government to a questionnaire concerning detention at Guantánamo Bay submitted by the mandate holders, interviews conducted by the mandate holders with former detainees currently residing or detained in France, Spain and the United Kingdom and responses from lawyers acting on behalf of some Guantánamo Bay detainees to questionnaires submitted by the mandate holders. It is also based on information available in the public domain, including reports prepared by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), information contained in declassified official United States documents and media reports. The report raises a number of important and complex international human rights issues. In view of the fact that an on-site visit was not conducted and owing to page limitations, the report should be seen as a preliminary survey of international human rights law relating to the detainees in Guantánamo Bay. In accordance with usual practice, the United States Government was provided with a draft of this report on 16 January 2006. In its reply of 31 January 2006, the Government requested that its response be attached to the finalized report (see Annex). A number of revisions were made to the draft report in the light of the Government’s reply of 31 January 2006.
I find this report very readable and recommend it as a summary of the problems with the situation in Guantánamo.
#Iraq